Problems / AI security and governance, hard

Injected instructions in email

An email agent reads inbound messages and can call tools. Attackers send 200 emails a second containing instructions to forward data.

Free to open. Runs in your browser, no sign-up.

Your goals

Success ≥ 95%, block ≥ 95% of the injections.

The traffic

2 requests a second for 45 seconds: 100% task (writes).

The system

What each component does in this design, and what calls it. The simulator mimics each one from these settings.

ComponentIts job hereSettings
Load balancerLoad balancerTraffic enters here.Calls Agent API.Layer 4 balancers route by IP and port; layer 7 balancers read HTTP and can route by path or header.–
Agent APIApp serviceLoad balancer forwards to it.Calls Agent orchestrator.Little's law: throughput ≈ concurrency ÷ latency. 200 slots at 50 ms serve about 4,000 req/s.3 replicas × 500 slots · timeout 180 s
Agent orchestratorAgent orchestratorAgent API calls it.Calls Model, MCP tool servers.An agent loops: think, call a tool, read the result, repeat until done.400 slots · 3 steps
ModelLLM endpointAgent orchestrator calls it.Latency has two parts: time to the first token, then a steady stream of tokens per second.2000 streams
MCP tool serversTool / MCP serverAgent orchestrator calls it.Tools give the model actions such as search or database queries; each call is another round trip.2000 slots

Hints

Try it first. Open one hint at a time if you get stuck.

Hint 1

Untrusted content must not steer the agent.

Hint 2

Screen it before the agent sees it.

One way to solve it

Put a prompt-injection filter in front (and keep untrusted text out of the control flow).

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